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I. INTRODUCTION
A popular move to recognize and codify a parent-child privilege
has surfaced, despite rejection by a majority of the courts that have
considered the issue.' Reminded of the horrors accompanying totali-
tarian systems that require children to testify against their parents,
some commentators have asserted that adoption of such a privilege
will promote the success of the family relationship in this country and
avoid the trauma of family members testifying against each other at
trial.2 This article is a response to those assertions and, in turn, pro-
1. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 533, 88 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1985)(noting that fourth, fifth, ninth, and eleventh circuits
have rejected parent-child privilege); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985)(assert-
ing that parent-child privilege should be legislatively, not judicially, recognized); United States
v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985)(listing cases rejecting parent-child privilege); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena of Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816, 817 (1 1th Cir. 1984)(no federal judicial
support for parent-child privilege); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir.
1982)(emancipated adult child may not assert parent-child privilege in grand jury proceed-
ings); United States v. Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)("no such thing" as
parent-child privilege); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Mass.
1983)(weight of authority is against adopting parent-child privilege); State v. Gilroy, 313
N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981)(spousal testimonial privilege should not be extended to commu-
nications between parent and child); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)(no
parent-child testimonial privilege in Missouri).
2. See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications. Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 632 (1970)(proposing model statute to establish parent-child
privilege); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination
and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (1982)(parent-child communications should be beyond reach
of legal system); Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept,
28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 610 (1987)(protection of stable family environment strong
argument for adopting parent-child privilege); Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the
Constitutional Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002,
1003 (suggesting guidelines, defining and delimiting privilege); Comment, The Parent-Child
Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 782-91 (1979)(discussing policy bases for
privilege); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 910
(1987)(conflict between family loyalty and need for all relevant evidence); Comment, Parent-
Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Privacy, 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 901, 902 (1983)(failure to recognize parent-child privilege an anomaly consider-
ing Supreme Court priority on sanctity of family); cf Note, Questioning the Recognition of a
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poses that both judicial recognition and legislative codification are in-
appropriate at this time.
The article will generally address the nature and underlying ration-
ale of privileges and will specifically address the arguments set out by
proponents of the parent-child privilege. Finally, the article will cri-
tique the model parent-child privilege proposed by the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Section.
II. PRIVILEGES: THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The purpose of an adversarial proceeding is to obtain the truth
about a particular event.' Specifically, in a criminal trial the goal is to
determine whether the defendant committed the charged offense.'
The proceedings, however, are bounded by principles of due process
which require, in part, that facts presented to the fact-finder be rele-
vant and competent.' Even assuming that these minimal conditions
are satisfied, evidence may be inadmissible on the ground that it is
privileged.6 The term "privilege" may be used to describe a limitation
on admissibility which the courts or the legislature have deemed nec-
essary to protect some other compelling interest.'
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142, 156 (1980)(noting commentators'
argument that to reveal child's confidences is repugnant to social sensibilities).
3. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1974)(discussing cross-examina-
tion and adversarial proceedings).
4. See W. LA FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 36-37 (1984).
5. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. art. IV (Relevancy); FED. R. CRIM. EVID. art. VI (Witnesses);
TEX. R. EVID. art. IV (Relevancy); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. art. IV (Relevancy); TEX. R. EVID.
art. VI (Witnesses); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. art. VI (Witnesses). These two requirements of
relevancy and competency lie at the heart of the law of evidence. Other rules requiring authen-
tication and rejection of hearsay depend heavily, if not exclusively, on these two foundations.
Some privileges are founded on competency considerations. For example, the historical basis
of the rule barring testimony of the wife against her husband rested on the proposition that the
wife was not competent to testify against her master. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 53 (1980); see also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 66, at 161-63 (3d ed. 1984); 2 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 603, at 862-63 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
6. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72, at 170-72 (3d ed. 1984)(listing pur-
poses of privilege rules); id. § 74, at 175-76 (pointing out limitations on effectiveness of privi-
lege); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2175, at 3-4 (McNaughten
rev. 1961)(extrinsic policy of exclusion); id. § 2197, at 113-14 (summary of privileges); id.
§ 2285, at 527-28 (listing principles of privileged communications).
7. The term "privilege" often includes references to a constitutional or statutory right not
to give incriminating evidence-a personal right which, like other rights, may be waived. See
generally H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 62-63
(1983).
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Privileges are generally disfavored because they often suppress
otherwise reliable evidence and thus impede the discovery of truth. In
Trammel v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court
reiterated:
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamen-
tal principle that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence. As
such they must be strictly construed and accepted only to the very lim-
ited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evi-
dence has a public good transcending the normally predominant
principles or utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.9
Thus, any proposed new privilege-a rule of exclusion-must be scru-
tinized carefully as to its purposes and probable effects.
A key element of virtually every privilege is confidentiality.' If the
holder of the privilege destroys the element of confidentiality, the
privilege is generally considered waived.II Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that in setting out a four-part template for recognizing any new
common law privilege, Professor Wigmore made confidentiality the
keystone:
1. Did the communication originate in a confidence that it would not
be disclosed?
2. Is the element of confidentiality essential to a full and satisfactory
maintenance of the parties' relationship?
3. Is the relationship one which in the opinion of the community
should be fostered?
4. Will the injury that would inure to the relationship, because of dis-
closure, be greater than the benefit thereby gained for correct disposal
of the litigation? 1
2
8. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
9. Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted).
10. The importance attached to confidentiality is especially evident where the privilege
explicitly indicates that only "confidential" communications will be protected. In other privi-
leges, the requisite confidentiality is presumed. See, e.g., TEX. R. EvID. 507 (trade secrets
privilege); TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 507 (same). See generally J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527-28 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 723 (9th Cir.)(statements to attorney
not privileged where third party present), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984); United States v.
Klaye, 707 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir.)(statements to one's spouse by telephone not privileged
when third party listening), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858 (1983); TEX. R. EvlD. 511 (waiver of
privilege by voluntary disclosure); TEX. R. CRIM. EvlD. 511 (same); C. MCCORMICK, EvI-
DENCE § 80, at 193-94 (3d ed. 1984); id. § 90, at 215-17.




In other words, the test for adopting a new privilege should be
whether allowing the exclusion will foster the relationship it is
designed to protect. 13 This traditional and accepted template is some-
times referred to as the "utilitarian" justification for privileges.' 4
More recently, however, some commentators and courts have urged
an alternative "nonutilitarian" justification. 15 They argue that some
privacy interests are entitled to protection without regard to whether
a privilege will actually promote a protected relationship. Under this
theory, a privilege is justified if it protects the privacy of a human
relationship. 6
The language in Trammel and the justifications offered to support
privileges indicate that traditional privileges are the results of a care-
ful and thoughtful balancing process: weighing the need for the evi-
dence to determine the "truth" against the need to protect some
public good. That "good" may be the maintenance of confidentiality
between marriage partners,'7 the protection of state secrets,'8 the as-
surance of complete and accurate medical' 9 or mental care,2" the pro-
vision of sound legal advice,2' or the protection of some financial
interest.22
Each jurisdiction is generally free to strike its own balance between
the need for evidence and the protection of the public good. As a
general rule, no jurisdiction is required to recognize any particular
13. See id.
14. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (3d ed. 1984)(utilitarian justification for
privileges).
15. See id. § 72, at 172; see also Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals. Lawyers and
Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 600 (1980)(advocating balance of practical and theoretical
considerations); Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the
Fundamental Right to Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 916-20 (1983)(weighing policies for
and against parent-child privilege).
16. See Roberts v. Superior Court, 508 P.2d 309, 316 (Cal. 197 3)(constitutionally recog-
nized right to privacy in psychotherapist-patient privilege). See generally Black, The Marital
and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 46-52.
17. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 504 (husband-wife privilege); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504
(same).
18. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 509 (1972 proposed final draft)(printed in 56 F.R.D. 183,
251-54 (1973)); MIL. R. EVID. 505 (classified information).
19. See TEX. R. EVID. 509 (physician-patient privilege). But see TEX. R. CRIM. EVID.
509 (no physician-patient privilege in criminal trials).
20. See TEX. R. EVID. 510 (confidentiality of mental health information); see also TEX.
R. CRiM. EVID. 510 (communications by alcohol or drug abusers privileged).
21. See TEX. R. EVID. 503 (attorney-client privilege); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 503 (same).
22. See TEX. R. EVID. 507 (trade secrets).
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privilege.2 3 An exception to this general rule lies in those privileges
with constitutional underpinnings, such as the privilege against self-
incrimination.2 4 With such privileges, a minimum level of protection
is required by the United States Constitution. A state would, of
course, be free to establish a more protective privilege either through
statute or through interpretation of its own constitution.25
The disparity among privileges recognized by courts is exemplified
by the fact that not all jurisdictions have adopted the physician-pa-
tient privilege. 26 Additionally, many states do not recognize an ac-
cused's privilege to suppress the testimony of his or her spouse.2 7
Even where a state has adopted a particular privilege, the specific
boundaries of that privilege may vary greatly from other jurisdictions.
For example, in some states which recognize the spousal privilege, the
ability to suppress confidential communications made between
spouses is absent where they have engaged in joint criminal activity.28
Most of the commonly recognized privileges depend, to some
extent, on professional relationships in which a certain degree of
23. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 73.2, at 174-75 (3d ed. 1984). Occasionally, con-
flict of law questions arise where litigation in a forum state involves communications made
outside the forum state which may or may not be recognized as privileged under the laws of
the forum state. See id.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (privilege against self-incrimination).
25. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (deferring to state privilege law in civil diversity proceedings
in federal court); see also S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 331 (4th ed. 1986). Federal decisions concerning testimonial privileges are not bind-
ing on the states. See Loesch v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 649 n.4 (Alaska 1980).
26. See Goldberg, The Physician-Patient Privilege-An Impediment to Public Health, 16
PAC. L.J. 787, 792 (1985)(fifteen states do not recognize physician-patient privilege). But see
FED. R. EVID. 501 (granting trial court discretion to recognize privileges in accordance with
common law).
27. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 504 (recognizing confidential communications privilege be-
tween husband and wife) with TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 504(1) (recognizing testimonial privilege
between husband and wife). For a listing of how various states have treated the two possible
husband-wife privileges see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9 (1980)(jurisdictional
survey).
28. See TEX. R. EVID. 504(d)(1); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1)(d)(1). The federal courts
are split on the issue of whether to recognize a spousal confidential communication privilege
when both husband and wife have engaged in joint criminal activity. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Subpoena of Koecher, 755 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated as moot per curiam
sub nom. United States v. Koecher, - U.S. -9 ,106 S. Ct. 1253, 88 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1986)(dis-
cussing split among circuits on whether to apply the privilege). The Supreme Court agreed to
consider this particular case in the 1985 term. However, after hearing oral arguments, the
Court learned that the case was moot and remanded the case to the lower court without decid-
ing the issue. See United States v. Koecher, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1253, 88 L. Ed. 2d 46
(1986).
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confidentiality is assumed.29 For example, in the attorney client rela-
tionship, most clients believe that what they tell their lawyer will re-
main confidential. If the client is not already aware of the privilege,
his attorney will inform him of its existence during their consulta-
tions.3" Because the assistance of counsel is considered an essential
element of the American legal system, the law generally permits the
client to prevent disclosure of any confidential communications made
to his counsel. 3 ' In theory, the assurance of confidentiality fosters not
only the immediate attorney-client relationship, but also educates
others who observe the privilege in operation and depend on confiden-
tiality in their own future conversations.32
Few privileges are absolute, and the public's overriding interest in
disclosure may tip the balance away from confidentiality. In regard to
the attorney-client privilege, some jurisdictions permit disclosure over
objection where the communication reveals ongoing criminal activ-
ity.33 Likewise, in regard to the spousal privilege, otherwise protected
communications may be compelled where spousal abuse or other sim-
ilar crimes are in issue.34 A defendant's constitutional rights to con-
frontation and compulsory process may also require disclosure of
privileged information.35
29. With professional privileges, it can reasonably be expected that the professional will
inform the individual of the existence of the privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory com-
mittee's note (1972 proposed final draft)(printed in 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973)).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 503(b) (general rule of lawyer-client privilege).
32. See State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle County, 193 A.2d 799, 807 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1963). The Delaware Superior Court asserted:
[T]he duty of the confidant of nondisclosure of confidential communications is imposed to
protect the reliance interest of the communicant, with an assent of the community. This
reliance interest is protected because such protection will encourage certain communica-
tions. Encouraging these communications is desirable because the communications are
necessary for the maintenance of certain relationships. It is socially desirable to foster the
protected relationships because other beneficial results are achieved, such as the promo-
tion of justice, public health and social stability. These goals are promoted in furtherance
of a well-organized, peaceful society, which in turn is considered necessary for human
survival.
Id.
33. See TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 503(d)(1) (exempts attorney-client privilege where allowing
it would further crime or fraud).
34. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(d)(1), (2) (no marital privilege allowed where commu-
nication made in furtherance of crime or testimony relates to family violence).
35. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)(due process requires disclo-
sure); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)(confrontation clause may require disclo-
sure); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967)(compulsory process required invalidation
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The delicate process of drafting and adopting any particular privi-
lege is, of course, a controversial task. One need only look so far as
the process of adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence36 to see that the
debate concerning adoption of privileges for federal cases finally re-
sulted in the rejection of separate codifications for each privilege. In-
stead, Congress agreed to a simple, flexible rule which states that
privileges will be determined by the federal courts.37
In forging their own versions of codified rules of evidence, state
courts and legislatures have, in most cases, modeled their efforts after
the federal version. 8 However, some jurisdictions have codified their
own specific rules of privilege,3 9 and some of these rules have been
patterned after the federal privilege rules rejected by Congress.40 In
other instances, drafters have adopted privileges which were not only
rejected at common law, but which also reflect the parochial interests
of some narrow segment of state practice.41 In each case, however,
the drafters were explicitly or implicitly striking the balance between
disclosure for the purposes of determining the truth and the need to
nurture or protect some public good.
of Texas statute treating co-accused as incompetent witness). See generally Hill, Testimonial
Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1173 (1980).
36. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1-6
(4th ed. 1986)(discussing process of adopting federal rules of evidence).
37. See FED. R. EvID. 501. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law sup-
plies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
38. Within several years of the effective date of the Federal Rules, January 1975, seven
states had codified their evidence rules. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 775-98 (2d ed. 1980)(master chart comparing federal and state rules
for Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin).
39. See, e.g., S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI & D. SCHLUETER, MILITARY RULES OF Evi-
DENCE MANUAL § V, at 413-88 (2d ed. 1986); TEX. R. EvID. 501-512.
40. See generally FED. R. EVID. art. V (1972 proposed final draft)(printed in 56 F.R.D.
183 (1973)).
41. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 510 (privilege for statements to psychiatrists) with TEX. R.
CRIM. EVID. 510 (privilege for statements by persons involved in treatment of alcohol or drug
abuse). The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence specifically state that there is no physician-
patient privilege in state criminal proceedings. See TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 509.
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It is also important to note that the generic term "privilege" may
actually refer to one of two privileges: the privilege not to take
the stand or the privilege not to reveal the contents of a particular
communication. The first is generally referred to as the adverse testi-
monial privilege and the second is generally referred to as the confi-
dential communications privilege.42  Of the two, the adverse
testimonial privilege is obviously broader because it will exclude testi-
mony about anything which a witness would have observed or heard.
Under the confidential communications privilege, a witness may take
the stand and relate what he observed43 and what he heard, so long as
what he heard is not confidential.' Thus, in examining any proposed
privilege it is essential to determine the exact scope of the information
which the privilege will conceal from the fact-finder.
In some applications of the parent-child privilege, neither the par-
ent nor the child is required to take the stand and testify against the
other.45 Other proposals are more limited and would only prohibit
disclosure of confidential communications between the child and the
parent.46 Most versions protect only communications made by the
child to the parent. 47 The issue of the extent to which any privilege
42. See State v. Teel, 712 P.2d 792, 794 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985)(subject of privilege must
be both confidential and a communication); State v. Bonaparte, 660 P.2d 334, 336 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983)(two distinct privileges included in marital privilege statute); see also Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)(confidential communications).
43. See State v. Teel, 712 P.2d at 794-95; State v. Bonaparte, 660 P.2d at 336-37.
44. In some jurisdictions, otherwise confidential communications are not destroyed by
inadvertent disclosure. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(5) (communication is confidential if not
intended for disclosure to third persons); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 503(a)(5) (same).
45. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev.
1983)(child granted testimonial privilege not to testify against parent); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings of Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 579, 587 (D. Conn. 1982)(mother not required to
testify against daughter on religious grounds). See generally Note, Recognition of a Parent-
Child Testimonial Privilege, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 676 (1979)(proposal to grant privilege to both
parent and child).
46. See In re A & M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (App. Div. 1978)(communications by minor
child may be privileged); see also IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987)(parent not compelled
to disclose). The form of the parent-child privilege which only prohibits disclosure of confi-
dential communications between the child and the parent is the most popular with commenta-
tors. See generally Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An
Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 58 (1982)(proposing statute granting privilege to
minor children). Cf Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV.
910, 925 (1987)(would extend privilege to adult children).
47. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(i)
(West Supp. 1987). The statutory privilege in Idaho provides:
Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any communica-
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should apply is discussed in more detail infra.
III. MEASURING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
A variety of arguments have been advanced in support of a number
of familial privileges,4" the most popular being the parent-child privi-
lege. Such a privilege was not recognized at common law4 9 and was
apparently not seriously considered by the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. ° The current momentum for recognition of such
a privilege was triggered in 1979, when a New York court adopted a
tion made by their minor child or ward to them concerning matter [matters] in any civil
or criminal action to which such child or ward is a party. Such matters so communicated
shall be privileged and protected against disclosure; excepting, this section does not apply
to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other nor to a criminal action or pro-
ceeding for a crime committed by violence of one against the person of the other, nor does
this section apply to any case of physical injury to a minor child where the injury has been
caused as a result of physical abuse or neglect by one or both parents, guardian or legal
custodian.
IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987). The statutory privilege in Minnesota provides:
A parent or the parent's minor child may not be examined as to any communications
made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent. A communication is confidential
if made out of the presence of persons not members of the child's immediate family living
in the same household. This exception may be waived by express consent to disclosure by
a parent entitled to claim the privilege or by the child who made the communication, or
by failure of the child or parent to object when the contents of a communication are
demanded. This exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse
against the other or by a parent or child against the other, nor to a proceeding to commit
either the child or parent to whom the communication was made or to place the person or
property or either under the control of another because of an alleged mental or physical
condition, nor to a criminal action or proceeding in which the parent is charged with a
crime committed against the person or property of the communicating child, the parent's
spouse, or a child of either the parent or the parent's spouse, or in which a child is
charged with a crime or act of delinquency committed against the person or property of a
parent or a child of a parent, nor to an action or proceeding for termination of parental
rights, nor any other action or proceeding on a petition alleging child abuse, child neglect,
abandonment or nonsupport by a parent.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(i) (West Supp. 1987). But see Watts, The Parent-Child Privi-
leges." Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 599 n.105
(1987)(proposing adverse testimonial and confidential communications privileges for both par-
ent and child).
48. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1563 (1985)(general discussion of familial privileges).
49. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227, at 211-13
(McNaughten rev. 1961)(privilege not generally recognized by common law).
50. Neither the Proposed Federal Rules, nor accompanying notes, nor legislative history
proposes a parent-child privilege.
1987] PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE
similar rule.51 Since then only Idaho,5 2 Minnesota, 53 and Massachu-
setts54 have codified a parent-child privilege. Of those courts which
have considered such a privilege, most have rejected it.55 The major-
ity of the cases applying the privilege were tried in New York state
courts, 56 and only a few federal courts have recognized or applied the
privilege.
Despite judicial reluctance to do so, virtually every commentator
addressing the issue has urged either legislative or judicial adoption of
a parent-child privilege.58 Some common themes or arguments have
51. See People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (Westchester County Ct. 1979)(priv-
ilege based upon right of privacy in United States and New York constitutions).
52. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987).
53. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(i) (West Supp. 1987).
54. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). The law was
amended in 1986 to make minor children incompetent to testify against their parents. That
new provision states:
Fourth, An unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall not testify before a
grand jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against said
parent, where the victim in such proceeding is not a member of said parent's family and
who does not reside in the said parent's household. For purposes of this clause the term
"parent" shall mean the natural or adoptive mother or father of said child.
Id. This amendment was made following a controversial ruling by the Massachusetts high
court which refused to excuse three minor children from testifying against their father. See
Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1068 (1984); see also Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 910, 913 (1987).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 106 S. Ct. 533, L. Ed. 2d 464 (1985); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of
Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816, 817 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 819 (4th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf State v. Gilroy,
313 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1981); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1206
(Mass. 1983); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
56. See, e.g., People v. Harrel, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (App. Div. 1978); In re A & M, 403
N.Y.S.2d 375, 377-82 (App. Div. 1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311-13 (West-
chester County Ct. 1979).
57. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325-31 (D. Nev.
1983)(survey of cases applying parent-child privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceedings of
Greenberg, I 1 Fed. R. Serv. 579, 584 (D. Conn. 1982)(acknowledging authority to create com-
mon law testimonial privileges).
58. See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 632 (1970); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential
Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 (1982); Watts, The Par-
ent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583,
600 (1987); Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy
Mandate a Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002, 1003; Note, The Parent-Child
Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 782-91 (1979); Note, Parent-Child Loyalty
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emerged from these writings and opinions. Their primary argument
is grounded on the constitutional right of privacy. Another argument
rests on the freedom of religion clause of the first amendment, with
the remainder being based on social or policy arguments.
A. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
Advocates of a parent-child privilege rely heavily upon decisions
from the United States Supreme Court indicating that a right of pri-
vacy is implied in the United States Constitution. 9 There are two
components to this right: the right to conduct one's affairs in private,
free from government intrusion, and the right to personal autonomy.
Griswold v. Connecticut 60 is an example of the first component, and
Roe v. Wade 61 is an example of the latter component. Proponents of
the privilege also point to decisions which stress the importance of
"family" privacy and autonomy. For example, the Court has indi-
cated that important personal decisions affecting marriage, 62 procrea-
tion,63 schooling,64 and living arrangements 65 are important rights
which the government should respect.
To date, however, no United States Supreme Court decision has
indicated that the right to privacy absolutely requires any privilege in
and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 910 (1987); Comment, Parent-Child Testi-
monial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 901, 902 (1983); cf Note, Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial
Privilege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142, 156 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)(right of privacy in-
cludes right to use contraceptives). The Court has never pinpointed a specific provision in the
Constitution as the source of this right of privacy. Rather, it is found in the penumbra of other
specific provisions, such as the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. See generally War-
ren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)(advocating recognition of
right of privacy).
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(freedom from intrusion by the government into decisions by
couples to use birth control devices).
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(recognizing womens' personal right to choose abortion).
62. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1978)(right to marry).
63. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)(right to abortion).
64. Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-31 (1972)(state's compelling interest in
compulsory education outweighed by family and religious training of Amish society); see also
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925)(recognizing right of parents to select
child's school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)(freedom of education essen-
tial to orderly pursuit of happiness).
65. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 521 (1977)(restricting household
inhabitants by blood relation).
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private communications among family members.66 The issue was
before the Court in the 1985 term, but was rendered moot before the
Court could make its decision. The case addressed the validity of a
joint-participant exception to the spousal communications privilege.6 7
Consequently, proponents of the privilege are left with advancing
the following syllogism: (1) there is a constitutional right to privacy;
(2) the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance
of the family and has in some cases declined from interfering with
child-rearing; (3) the Court has recognized the desirability of protect-
ing certain confidential communications, therefore; (4) there is a con-
stitutional basis for recognizing a parent-child privilege which will
nurture and protect the family unit.
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily follow from the first
three generally accepted arguments. The Supreme Court has been
hesitant in concluding that intimate personal decisions or actions are
necessarily protected as fundamental privacy rights. Indeed, deci-
sions such as Bowers v. Hardwick6 seem to signal the Court's reluc-
tance to further expand the concept of "privacy." 6 9 Proponents of the
parent-child privilege often fail to recognize that the constitutional
right to privacy, like so many other constitutional rights, is not abso-
lute. Even if a particular interest is protected under the broad and
nebulous umbrella of "privacy" and thus entitled to status as a "fun-
66. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-53 (1980). In Trammel, the Court
implied that, unlike spousal testimonial privileges, confidential communications privileges pro-
tect the intimacy of the marriage relationship. However, it did not say that such privileges
were constitutionally required. See id. Instead, the federal rule governing confidential marital
communications is grounded in the common law. See Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12
(1934).
67. See United States v. Koecher, - U.S. -_, 106 S. Ct. 1253, 88 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1986)(or-
der vacating and dismissing case as moot).
68. - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1986)(Constitution does not grant
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
69. See id. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 2846, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 148. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the
Supreme Court asserted:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new funda-
mental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of the [Due Process]
Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be funda-
mental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself authority to govern the coun-
try without express constitutional authority.
19871
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL
damental right,"'70 the government may still limit the right. However,
to do so, the government must demonstrate that it has a compelling
interest in limiting the right and that its means of limiting or intrud-
ing upon such right are necessary and closely tailored to furthering
the compelling governmental interest.71
The Supreme Court has generally recognized that this close scru-
tiny is necessary only where the government has significantly limited
the individual's exercise of his right to privacy. 2 In the absence of
such an intrusion the government's actions are generally subject only
to a "rational basis" review. That is, the government need only show
that there is some rational basis for its action.7 3 A common example
of this is the ability of states to set procedures and standards for ob-
taining marriage licenses. Although the right to marry is fundamen-
tal, absent a substantial interference with that right, no compelling
governmental interest need be shown for marital statutes.74
Even assuming that parent-child communications need some sort of
constitutional protection, the threshold issue is whether compelled
disclosure of otherwise confidential statements presents a significant
barrier to the right of the parent and child to communicate in the
future. Proponents argue that forcing a child or parent to testify
against the other will almost always harm the relationship. 75 How-
70. The Supreme Court has struggled with defining "fundamental" rights that are enti-
tled to heightened constitutional scrutiny. Aside from rights explicitly present in the Constitu-
tion, the Court has identified as fundamental those liberties which are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Other liberties recog-
nized by the Court as fundamental are those "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Bowers, - U.S. at
-,106 S. Ct. at 2844, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 146-47 (discussing whether homosexuals have funda-
mental right to engage in sodomy).
71. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
72. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977)(undue burden on decision to obtain
abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978)(state placed significant and direct
burden on person's opportunity to marry).
73. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980). In Harris, the Court rejected the
argument that failure of the government to fund abortions placed a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman desiring an abortion and then applied the rational basis test in concluding
that the legislative decision not to fund certain abortions was rationally based. See id.
74. See Zablocki, 435 U.S. at 388.
75. See, e.g., Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the
Child, 74 DIcK. L. REV. 599, 617 (1970)(compelling parental testimony will destroy rapport
crucial to sustaining parent-child relationship); Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential
Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 40-46 (1982)(unprivileged
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ever, the studies are inconclusive, as one proponent of a broad family
privilege points out. 76 Such a broad argument could be made in virtu-
ally any case where a family member or close friend is compelled to
testify against another member or friend. A privilege or exclusionary
rule should not be formulated to avoid a difficult or emotional di-
lemma, especially when revelation of the truth would be sacrificed.
Allowing that communications between a parent and child are enti-
tled to some constitutional protection and that compelled testimony is
a substantial intrusion, the government might still reasonably deny
protection where revelation of those communications is necessary to
further the compelling government interest in determining the truth
in a trial. This would seem especially true where a child's actions
have transgressed the criminal laws. Not only does the state have a
compelling interest in protecting its citizens, but the child's actions
might also be sufficiently egregious to exceed the protective bounds of
autonomous discretion, which is generally free from governmental
intrusion.
Furthermore, other decisions of the Court on the topic of privacy
erode the proponents' constitutional argument. In a line of decisions,
the Court has indicated that a child's decision to obtain an abortion
may not be blocked by her parents.7 7 Thus, even within the sanctity
of family relations, the parents' control may be subject to limitation
for the good of the child. This same reasoning should support limited
governmental intrusion for the specific purpose of determining the
truth in a judicial proceeding.
communications lead to breakdown of family as center of child development); Watts, The
Parent-Child Privileges. Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
583, 604 (1987)(without adoption of parent-child privilege, mutual trust between parent and
child will be destroyed); Comment, The Parent-Child Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 771, 787-88 (1979).
76. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1578-81 (1985).
77. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983)(government must provide alternative means of determining if minor capable of deciding
whether abortion in best interest where parents refuse consent); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 411 (1981)(upholding statute allowing abortion despite parental objection); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979)(state must provide alternative to parental consent); cf
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)(spouse not allowed veto power dur-
ing first trimester).
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B. The Constitutional Right to Freedom of Religion
A second possible constitutional argument is that compelling testi-
mony from a child will violate the tenets of the family's religious be-
liefs and infringe upon the free exercise right provided by the first
amendment.78 The argument is that in some religions much spiritual
emphasis is placed on the sanctity of the family. At least two courts
have applied the privilege on religious grounds.79 Like the privacy
argument, there is some superficial appeal to this justification.
For "mainline" religions it is generally not difficult to point to reli-
gious teachings or writings and find some credible reference to family
unity and respect for one's parents and elders. Indeed, for those of
the Judeo-Christian faiths, the Fourth Commandment mandates that
children honor their fathers and mothers. However, theologians
would likely struggle with the delicate questions that might arise if, in
the search for truth, reliable evidence was suppressed by reliance on
similar teachings. The possible conflict of religious values poses some
problem for codifying any particular parent-child privilege. While
there are apparently some religious writings which point to protection
of the family relationship, there are also religious writings which rec-
ognize the ability of parents to testify against their children. In the
Old Testament book of Deuteronomy, the book of Mosaic law, in-
struction is given as to dealing with troublesome children:
If any man has a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey his
father or his mother, and when they chastise him, he will not even listen
78. See Deuteronomy 24:16 (New American Standard Translation). This source simply
indicates that fathers shall not be put to death for their sons, nor shall sons be put to death for
their fathers; everyone shall be put to death for his own sin. See id. But see Diehl v. State, 698
S.W.2d 712, 721 n.5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)(Levy, J., dissenting).
Talmudic commentary interprets it as a ban on adverse testimony:
What is that implication of the text 'The fathers shall not be put to death for the sins of
the children?' If it implies the fathers shall be put to death for the iniquity of the fathers,
that has already been stated (Deut. 24, 16): "every man shall be put to death for his own
sin." But the text implies that the fathers shall not be put to death on the testimony of the
children and the children on the testimony of their fathers.
Id. (quoting Sanhedrin 27b)(emphasis original). However, Deuteronomy 21:18-21 explicitly
permits parents to testify against incorrigible children and in effect provide evidence sufficient
to sustain the penalty of death. See Deuteronomy 21:18-21 (New American Standard
Translation).
79. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1298 (D. Nev.
1983)(applying parent-child privilege pursuant to tenets of Catholic faith); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings of Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 579, 587 (D. Conn. 1982)(applying parent-child
privilege pursuant to tenets of conservative Jewish teachings).
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to them, then his father and mother shall seize him, and bring him out
to the elders of his city at the gateway of his home town. And they
shall say to the elders of the city, "This son of ours is stubborn and
rebellious, he will not obey us, he is a glutton and a drunkard."
Then all the men of his city shall stone him to death; so you shall
remove the evil from your midst, and all Israel shall hear of it and
fear.80
Particular religious beliefs notwithstanding, the courts have recog-
nized time and again that the freedom to practice one's religion,
although fundamental, is not absolute."1 The current standard used
by the Supreme Court in determining whether the first amendment's
free exercise clause has been violated bears markings of a balancing
test.82 An individual must first show that the governmental action
places a significant or substantial burden on that individual's religious
beliefs or practices. Assuming such a burden is established, it must be
balanced against the importance of the government's interests and the
effect that allowing an exception would cause.83 Whereas significant
governmental burdens on an individual's religious beliefs will be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny,84 incidental governmental burdens may be
80. Deuteronomy 21:18-21 (New American Standard Translation). The passage quoted
in the text is cited not to support the death penalty for recalcitrant children, but to demon-
strate the well-known and oft-cited proposition that both sides of any reasonable ethical or
moral issue can be supported by religious writings or teachings. In short, it is not clear that
religious teachings necessarily and unalterably require a parent-child privilege.
81. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, - U. S.... ,106 S. Ct. 2147, 2158, 90 L. Ed. 2d 735, 744
(1986). Chief Justice Burger asserted: "given the diversity of beliefs in our pluralistic society
and the necessity of providing governments with sufficient operating latitude, some incidental
neutral restraints on free exercise of religion are inescapable." Id.
82. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972)(Amish children not required to
attend public schools after eighth grade).
83. See, e.g., id. at 213-15; Goldman v. Weinberger, - U.S .... 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1314,
89 L. Ed. 2d 478, 485 (1986)(finding military regulation preventing wearing of religious ap-
parel with uniform not significant burden on religious freedom); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905)(individual may be required to receive a vaccination); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1879)(upholding federal law directed at Mormons prohibiting
polygamy).
84. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. Determining what constitutes a significant burden is a
threshold issue and one not easily defined. See Roy, - U.S. at -_, 106 S. Ct. at 2158, 90 L.
Ed. 2d at 744. Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion, attempted to draw a distinction
between those government regulations which may result in a criminal penalty being imposed
against those exercising their religious freedom and those being denied government benefits.
The former would be considered significant, while the latter of a less intrusive nature. The
Chief Justice noted that "virtually every action that the Government takes, no matter how
innocuous it might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection." Id. at -
ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:35
sustained so long as there is some rational basis for the governmental
action.85
In the proper circumstances, the need for determining truth in a
trial may outweigh religious tenets compelling silence. Assuming that
the government has substantially interfered with the practice of reli-
gion by requiring disclosure of parent-child communications, it must
demonstrate that its interests are compelling and that requiring the
testimony is a necessary means to further those interests.86 Obtaining
reliable evidence for a trial, especially a criminal trial, should be con-
sidered a compelling interest.87 Another inherent difficulty with rely-
ing upon the freedom of religion justification for a parent-child
privilege is the general reluctance of the courts to question the legiti-
macy of a particular religious belief.88 However, the courts may in-
quire into the centrality and sincerity of the belief.8 9
C. Social Policy Arguments
1. Preservation of the Family
Proponents of a parent-child privilege argue that important and
n.17, 106 S. Ct. at 2156 n.17, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 749 n.17. As an example, the Chief Justice noted
that someone might invoke a religious objection based on Norse mythology to filing a tax
return on Woden's day (Wednesday). See id.
85. See Roy, - U.S. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 2156, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 749-50 ("the Government
meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental bene-
fits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate
public interest."). But see id. at -_, 106 S. Ct. at 2166, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 762 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)(no precedent for application of rational basis test in area
of free exercise clause).
86. As with most of the free exercise clause cases, which seem to apply general rules in an
ad hoc manner, see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), whether testimony
would be necessary turns on the facts and circumstances of the case and the availability of
alternative, reliable evidence.
87. Whether obtaining reliable evidence for a civil trial should be considered a compelling
governmental interest is debatable. In such cases, the government's interest is really that of the
individual litigant seeking disclosure. Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 & n.19
(1974). In Nixon, the Supreme Court stressed that its concern with the balance between the
President's claim to an executive privilege and the need to produce all relevant evidence was
grounded in the constitutional dimensions of criminal proceedings, which are not present in
civil litigation. See id.
88. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)(deciding what constitutes a reli-
gious belief is delicate matter).
89. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)(courts may inquire into
whether individual's assertion made in good faith); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (claims must be
"rooted in religious belief," Court distinguished beliefs of Amish from philosophical and per-
sonal beliefs such as those of Thoreau).
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compelling interests are at stake any time a child, or parent, is com-
pelled to testify against the other. Proponents assert that studies indi-
cate the nuclear family is in danger of extinction and that any
privilege protecting the family will serve as an invaluable bastion
against external threats. 9° The family, they argue, should be permit-
ted to work through any problem without fear of disclosure of any
private communications. 9'
These social policy arguments urging protection of interfamilial
communications have some superficial appeal. Most parents welcome
and encourage frank communications from their children. However,
the credibility of these arguments is diminished when it becomes ap-
parent that neither proponents nor opponents of the parent-child priv-
ilege can cite convincing empirical data to show whether such a
privilege ever encourages frank and confidential discussions. 92 It is
much easier, and more convincing, to consider the more tangible and
immediate effects of using the privilege to suppress the introduction of
probative evidence. Furthermore, the difficulty in relying upon a par-
ticular social theory or philosophy for a privilege is that other equally
credible movements or theories may be ignored. For example, advo-
cates of the popular "tough-love" movement might conceivably wel-
come "tough" testimony from parents concerning disposition of a
child accused of criminal conduct. A child's, or some other third per-
son's, ability to obstruct that testimony would interfere with the par-
ents' autonomous right to rear their children the way they deem
necessary and proper.
2. Repugnancy of Family Members Testifying Against
Each Other
Another argument raised in support of the privilege is grounded on
the natural repugnancy of requiring family members to testify against
each other. 93 It seems apparent that to rely upon such testimony can,
in some instances, be problematic and a tactic to be avoided in all but
90. See Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 610-11 (1987).
91. See id. at 608.
92. See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1578-81 (1985)(noting empirical stand-off as to whether parent-child privilege encourages
frank discussion between parents and children).
93. See Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. at 611-13.
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the rarest of circumstances. However, should the fact that, in some
situations, there may be difficulty in admitting the testimony support
a privilege which would apply even where it would not be repugnant
and would not create a dilemma for the testifying member? Examples
sometimes cited to advance this argument are the reminders that to-
talitarian governments do not recognize a parent-child privilege. 94
Such reminders do little more than stir the emotions, and ignore the
fact that until recently, little, if any, serious attention was paid to such
a privilege by either the courts or commentators in this country.
Our system of government, past or present, in no way resembles
Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. As with any aspect of the judicial
process which is subject to abuse, the courts' and the public's response
to "repugnant" use of familial testimony provides an adequate rem-
edy. Few prosecutors are willing to incur public wrath and criticism
for needless use of testimony of either a child or a parent against the
other. In short, the fear of abuse is simply not sufficiently well-
founded to justify the codification of a parent-child privilege and is
certainly not grounds for blanket exclusion of otherwise reliable
evidence.
3. The Cruel Trilemma
A related social policy argument sometimes raised is that calling a
family member to the stand creates a cruel trilemma for the witness.95
The witness must either (1) testify truthfully and condemn the ac-
cused-relative, (2) testify falsely and commit perjury, or (3) refuse to
testify and risk contempt. A similar trilemma, however, faces every
witness in such a situation. 96 Is the trilemma for the witness any less
compelling when the accused is a lifelong friend or associate? Some
94. See Diehl v. State, 698 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no
writ)(Levy, J., dissenting). Justice Levy asserted:
[Requiring parents and children to testify against each other] is inconsistent with the way
of life we cherish, and raises the spectre of a totalitarian regime, as created by Adolph
Hitler and imagined by George Orwell, where systematic government programs attempt
to 'persuade' young children to inform against their parents. We want no 'Hitler Jugend'
in the United States, nor do we want the police to behave in a manner which brings the
law into disrepute.
Id.
95. See id. (risking perjury or contempt "could seriously undermine public respect and
confidence in our system of justice"); see also Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential
Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 46 (1982).
96. The witness' trilemma is often associated with the right against self-incrimination.
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would answer that when blood ties are at stake, the burden on the
witness is especially difficult. That response seems to place a higher
premium on mere blood ties, while ignoring the actual relationships
involved. In some cases the blood ties are all that exist where the
child or parent has shown little familial intimacy, love or respect-
until judicial proceedings are commenced.
The problem with this particular social policy argument is that it
assumes that whatever familial tie exists will necessarily vanish once
the witness is compelled to take the stand. If the family relationship
is indeed based on trust and respect, which is the proponents' basis for
the privilege, then that relationship should withstand the compulsion
to testify. Even assuming that the relationship would suffer, such is
not enough reason to codify a privilege and suppress otherwise relia-
ble evidence.97
D. Other Legal Arguments
Federal Rule of Evidence 50198 is sometimes cited by proponents as
authority for codifying a parent-child privilege. 99 The argument gen-
erally asserts that Congress recognized the importance of developing
privileges in American jurisprudence and that the flexible language of
rule 501 not only permits the adoption of new privileges, but also en-
courages such adoption."o However, review of the history of rule 501
indicates that it was a compromise. There was such a negative re-
sponse to the codification of any privilege that Congress decided to
defer to the courts.101 Such a compromise can hardly be viewed as a
mandate to codify a parent-child privilege that has been rejected by
most of the courts which have considered it. Rule 501 can be relied
97. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 213-17 (McNaughten rev. 1961 & Supp.
1986). Professor Wigmore observed that the danger of discord which might arise from spouses
testifying against each other is only a "casual and minor one, not to be exaggerated into the
foundation of so important a rule." Id. at 216. Although Professor Wigmore was addressing
the adverse testimonial privilege, the same conclusion would seem apropos for any parent-
child privilege.
98. FED. R. EVID. 501 (allowing federal courts to formulate specific privileges).
99. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1322 (D. Nev. 1983).
100. Proponents assert that the underlying legislative history of Congress' rejection of the
more restrictive proposed privileges supports a liberal attitude toward recognizing privileges.
See Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence:
A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 616 (1976).
101. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 333-
35 (4th ed. 1986).
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upon just as strongly by opponents of the privilege; the better course
is to test the viability of the privilege in the courts instead of codifying
the privilege.
Another legal argument for adopting a parent-child privilege com-
pares other contemporary privileges which have commonly protected
a wide range of interests, including financial interests. The argument
is that if our judicial system is willing to protect marriage, attorney-
client, and physician-patient relationships through use of privileges,
then the system should protect the parent-child relationship."°2 The
fact that less altruistic relationships are protected does not justify cod-
ification of an additional privilege. This rationale is based upon the
arguable contention that existing privileges are necessary and that
adopting additional privileges is desirable. Yet, if a parent-child privi-
lege is widely adopted, then similar privileges may be extended to
other types of relationships.10 3 At least one commentator has called
for adoption of a privilege for "shared intimate relationships"'"
which would include protection of confidential communications be-
tween, inter alia, "intimate friends."' 10 5
A significant factor in rejecting a confidential communications priv-
ilege for the parent-child relationship is there is little reason to believe
that the parent and child would ever depend on such a privilege in
making statements to one another.10 6 In many of the other recog-
nized privileges, one of the parties, usually a professional, can be
trusted to expressly or impliedly inform the other that their communi-
102. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communications.- Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child,
74 DICK. L. REV. 599, 604-14 (1970)(discussing other evidentiary privileges as support for
child-parent privilege).
103. See People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. 1983)(spread of privilege would
be difficult to maintain). Fear that privileges similar to a parent-child privilege would be ex-
tended to other relationships is not unfounded. The difficulty with codifying or otherwise
adopting a parent-child privilege is to fairly include all of those who would deserve the privi-
lege. Once a utilitarian privilege is adopted, it must be broad enough to include the non-tradi-
tional families which may well be more loving and trusting than those of the traditional
composition: father, mother, and child. If one accepts the argument that it is the unique trust
and relationship of the "family" which gives rise to the privilege, then other so-called family
and intimate relationship privileges would be more easily accepted.
104. Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1588 (1985).
105. See id. at 1590. The author notes that such a privilege would cover "unmarried
cohabitants, homosexual lovers, and 'intimate' friends." Id.
106. See id. at 1578-81.
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cations will remain confidential." 7 Indeed, the drafters of the pro-
posed federal rule governing a marital privilege did not include a
confidential communications provision for this very reason. 0 8 Simi-
lar analysis would support rejecting any protection of family com-
munications.
E. Summary
In reviewing the various justifications for adoption of a parent-child
privilege, it is apparent that none is compelling. The constitutional
arguments are grounded primarily on dicta or analogy. Although
some courts have relied upon the right of privacy and the free exercise
clause, there are no United States Supreme Court opinions holding
that confidential communications are constitutionally protected. The
remaining arguments are founded primarily on sociological and psy-
chological viewpoints which are superficially attractive but insuffi-
cient to obstruct otherwise reliable information from the fact-finders.
In the balance, the need for such information outweighs any constitu-
tional or social interest which the parent and child might otherwise
possess.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSED ABA MODEL
A. Introduction
In the past several years, considerable effort has been expended
drafting various proposals for a workable parent-child privilege. As
noted in the preceding discussion, the justifications for the privilege
do not support codifying legislation, nor do they support a wholesale
adoption by courts of the privilege. On the other hand, the arguments
against any parent-child privilege become clearer when one examines
the specifics of the proposed models.
Although proponents do not agree on the most appropriate model,
107. See State v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981)(statements to priest concern-
ing business transaction not protected). With privileges involving a professional, it is usually
not required that the professional actually advise the client that their communications will
remain confidential. For example, if the priest-penitent privilege is to apply it is necessary that
the penitent have made his statements to the priest pursuant to obtaining spiritual counseling
or advice. Statements made to a clergyman on matters of business would generally not be
protected. See id.
108. See FED. R. EvID. 505 advisory committee's note (1972 proposed final draft)
(printed in 56 F.R.D. 183, 246 (1973)).
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there are some common themes or issues in the various proposals.
Generally, the models follow a standard format for codification of
privileges. The proposed models typically cover: (1) definitions of
key terms; (2) the general rule of privilege; (3) identification of who
may claim the privilege; (4) waiver of the privilege; and (5) exceptions
to the rule of privilege. There is, of course, a variance in the coverage
of the models and in the quality and clarity of the draftsmanship.
For purposes of critique and analysis, this article focuses on a
model statute proposed by the American Bar Association's Criminal
Justice Section.109 The model represents considerable debate and
compromise and serves as a potential template for legislatures and
courts considering the adoption of a parent-child privilege."'
The proposed model offers two different privileges. The first is an
adverse testimonial privilege which allows either the parent or the
child to prevent the other from testifying. " 'l The second privilege is a
confidential communications privilege which allows either the parent
or the child to prevent the other from disclosing information which
was communicated with the intent that it remain confidential., 2 The
following sections briefly address the proposed model in the key areas
outlined above. Despite careful and narrow tailoring, the model itself
demonstrates inherent problems of interpretation and application
which are not found in some of the other more commonly accepted
privileges.
B. Definitions
As with most codified privileges, the proposed model contains defi-
nitions of key terms such as "parent," "child" and "confidential com-
munication." Although the topic of definitions may seem mundane, it
109. The ABA proposed model for codification of a parent-child privilege had its genesis
in the Criminal Justice Section and was presented to the Section at its meeting in August, 1986
in New York. After lengthy debate, the Section voted to seek the approval of the ABA House
of Delegates. In San Francisco in August 1987, at the annual meeting of the ABA, the propo-
sal was withdrawn with a view toward presenting it at the February, 1988 mid-year meeting.
See A Model Parent-Child Privilege (editor's note), 2 CRIM. JUST., No. 2, Summer 1987, at 34.
110. The current ABA proposed model for codification of a parent-child privilege, com-
pleted in April, 1987, is the result of several years of drafting and redrafting, compromise and
debate. A copy of the most recently available draft of that model and the drafters' comment
are included as appendices to this article.
111. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 102 (Current
Proposed).
112. See id. § 103.
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is in the definitional section that the real breadth of a privilege is often
buried. A parent-child privilege intended to have the broadest appli-
cation could define "child" to include any person having a "parent,"
which in turn could be defined to include not only a natural parent,
but also any person having control or responsibility for the child. 113
The application of this potentially broad definition could block com-
munications by an emancipated adult to a grandparent, uncle, guard-
ian, or older sibling. Even assuming that a parent-child privilege is
appropriate, this broad approach is unnecessary and resembles more
of a "family" privilege than a parent-child privilege.114
The definitions in the ABA proposed model statute are narrower,
but still capable of overbreadth. The definitions of "adverse," ' "
"party to a confidential communication,""' 6 and "proceeding" ' 17 are
unremarkable. However, the following terms are troublesome: (1)
"confidential communication";"" (2) "family member";" 9  (3)
"child"; 120 and (4) "parent."' 121
The first key term, "confidential communications" covers private
"messages" between a parent and the parent's child. 122 However, ac-
cording to the model definition, the messages need not be made in
absolute privacy because the presence of other family members does
not destroy the communication's confidentiality. 123 Nor would subse-
quent revelation of the messages to other family members defeat con-
113. See Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examina-
tion and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 58 (1982). For example, the Stanton model defines "par-
ent" as "the natural or adoptive parent, the stepparent or foster parent, guardian or other
adult having legal or practical responsibility for the unemancipated child." Id.
114. See notes 105-107 supra and accompanying text for discussion on the concerns for
adopting an unmanageable privilege.
115. ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 101(a) (Current Proposed).
116. Id. § 101(f).
117. Id. § 101(g).
118. Id. § 101(c).
119. Id. § 101(d).
120. Id. § 101(b).
121. Id. § 101(e).
122. See id. § 101(c). This section provides:
Confidential Communication means a message intended to convey a meaning, made be-
tween a parent and the parent's child with the reasonable expectation its content not be
known by anyone except family members. The message may be made by any means in-
cluding oral, written or sign language or assertive conduct.
Id.
123. See id. ("with the reasonable expectation its contents not be known by anyone except
family members.").
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fidentiality.124 According to the model, the term "family member,"
discussed infra, includes a parent or the parent's child. 125 It is not
clear whether "parent's child"'126 refers to only the child in question
or to another child of the parent, i.e., a sibling or another child of a
second parent. If the drafters intended this latter interpretation, 127
then the rule is broader than many privileges which may be nullified
by the presence of a third person. 121 Such an interpretation incor-
rectly assumes that other family members such as rival siblings have a
need to hear the confidential communication or to assist in solving
whatever problem may be revealed. Again, this extension creates the
possibility of a much broader, and wholly unjustifiable, "family"
privilege. 129
The second key term, "family member," 131 is an apparent attempt
to control the runaway breadth of the parent-child privilege. Yet, this
definition is also problematic. In addition to the difficulty of defining
"parent's child," there is apparently no requirement that the family
members actually reside together. 3 ' Superficially, the definition cov-
ers not only a "model" family relationship, but also seems to cover,
for example, confidential communications made by a desperate prodi-
gal child returning after an extended absence to obtain financial assist-
ance from otherwise uncaring parents. The proposed model ap-
parently makes no attempt to distinguish the two situations. This lack
of distinction marks another broad approach and demonstrates the
difficulty of adopting an appropriate privilege. Few legislators are
124. See id.
125. See id. § 101(d).
126. Id.
127. The language of section 101(c) implies that a family member other than either the
parent or the parent's child may be present. If the drafters intended to limit confidential com-
munications to a parent and a child, then the language referring to family members is unneces-
sary. Even more curious is the lack of clear guidance in the model definition itself as to
whether the presence of a second parent would defeat the privilege. In their comment at sec-
tion 101(c) (Appendix B to this article), the drafters indicate that the presence of a family
member will not void the privilege and that the definition is intentionally "broad."
128. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(1) (covers only marital communications not intended
for disclosure to another).
129. See generally Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450 (1985)(extensive discussion of privileged communications including history, theory,
and recent developments).
130. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 101(d) (Current
Proposed).




willing to define the concept of a worthy family relationship, even
though compelled revelation of confidential communications in a
trusting, loving relationship is arguably more repugnant to society
than a scenario involving a runaway returning only to obtain
money. 132
The third and fourth key terms define "child" and "parent." The
term "child" is defined as "a person who has not attained the age of
majority."' 33 The definition of "parent" is broad-it includes a natu-
ral or adoptive parent, a step-parent, or a legal guardian. 134  More
remarkable is the fact that the definition includes "any living person
the court recognizes to have acquired a right to act as a parent
... 135 The model lists as examples a foster parent or relative having
long-term custody of a child.' 36  This last category is particularly
troublesome. The examples cited by the drafters are not exclusive and
therefore a supervisor of a home for runaway children might qualify
as a person who has acquired a right to act as a parent. Even assum-
ing that the definition implies that a child is living in some sort of
"home" environment, it would still encompass statements made to an
adult sibling acting as a de facto surrogate parent. 137
Under the terms of the model privilege, the parent-child relation-
ship could be easily stretched to cover relationships which are not
familial. Although the Supreme Court has historically been generous
132. Similar line drawing is required in other privileges, where, for example, there must
be a marriage or some sort of professional relationship. See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b) (attorney-
client privilege limited to relationship between "client" and "lawyer" providing legal services);
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 503(b) (same); TEX. R. EvID. 504(a) (confidential communications priv-
ilege limited to communications made between spouses while married); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID.
504(l)(b) (same). This sort of definition requires much closer scrutiny of the motives for the
relationship.
133. ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 101(b) (Current Proposed).
The drafters' comment indicates that state law would control the issue of who is considered a
"minor." Id. § 101(b) (comment attending).
134. See id. § 101(e).
135. Id.
136. See id. The drafters note in their comment that the definition "could also include
situations where a parent/child relationship exists but there is no biological or legal relationship
between the two parties." Id. (comment attending)(emphasis added).
137. Some proponents argue that even if a parent-child privilege cannot encourage confi-
dential communication within the family, the absence of one would certainly discourage such
communication. This sort of utilitarian argument would seem to support the extended reason-
ing that, even though the communications were not made in a trusting or intimate family
context, future communications and reliance should not be jeopardized. See Developments in
the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1579 (1985).
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in defining "family, 1 38 it has not been faced with an argument that
someone responsible for a child might invoke a constitutional right
not to testify against the child.
The point here is that any attempt to draw workable definitions
entails the delicate and possibly offensive process of defining what
constitutes a "family." In an attempt to be fair to all possible family
arrangements, any model covering this point potentially stretches the
privilege beyond whatever tenuous rationale may have originally sup-
ported it.
C. The Adverse Testimonial Privilege
1. In General
In proposing models for a parent-child privilege, drafters have two
options. The privilege may be drafted to cover either or both: (1) an
adverse testimonial privilege; (2) a confidential communications privi-
lege. The first type of privilege prevents either the child or the parent
from taking the witness stand to testify against the other.139 Such a
privilege could be drafted to follow a similar privilege applicable in
some jurisdictions to adverse spousal testimony. This privilege is diffi-
cult to justify in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Trammel v.
United States,140 which rejected the argument that a defendant should
be able to suppress the testimony of his or her spouse.14 This partic-
ular privilege is vested in the witness spouse alone. The rationale for a
husband-wife privilege, marital harmony, is usually already absent if
one of the spouses is willing to testify against the other. 142 The same
138. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)(members of extended
family included within definition of "family"). The Court in Moore applied strict scrutiny to
invalidate a city's attempt to control the living arrangements of "related" members of a family.
See id. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974)(applying rational basis
test in sustaining ordinance affecting unrelated individuals). There is an analogous distinction
between attempts to control living arrangements and attempts to obtain information necessary
for either a criminal or civil proceeding.
139. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev.
1983)(applying adverse testimonial privilege). See generally Kandoian, The Parent-Child Priv-
ilege and the Parent-Child Crime: Observations on State v. De Long and In re Agosto, 36 ME.
L. REV. 59 (1984).
140. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
141. See id. at 52-53.
142. See id. at 52. Note, however, that according to one commentator fourteen states still
permit the accused spouse to prevent his or her spouse from testifying. See Developments in
the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1467 n.30 (1985).
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argument could be made with regard to any similar coverage of par-
ent-child testimony. That is, the existence of family harmony is ques-
tionable if either the child or the parent is willing to testify. The
adverse testimonial privilege is also potentially much broader than a
confidential communications privilege because it would exclude testi-
mony about what the witness observed without regard to whether he
had ever discussed it with another family member.
2. Scope and Waiver
The proposed model statute provides that the testifying parent or
child may decline to testify adversely against the other in any criminal
proceeding. 143 The proposed model statute indicates that the adverse
testimonial privilege is held by the parent or the child who is the wit-
ness. 1" However, the privilege will not exist with regard to a matter
which occurred before there was a parent-child relationship.145 This
appears to mirror what some jurisdictions treat as a marriage entered
into solely for the purpose of suppressing testimony. The marriage
usually remains valid, but neither spouse may prevent the other from
taking the stand.'46 In the context of the parent-child privilege, the
drafters of the model statute apparently recognized that two individu-
als could theoretically attempt to suppress testimony through adop-
tion or some similar action designed to make the relationship appear
to be one of parent and child.
3. Exceptions
The drafters of the model statute list two exceptions to the parent-
child testimonial privilege. First, the privilege is not available where
the defendant is charged with a crime against the witness or another
family member. 147 Second, the privilege is not available where the
witness and the defendant have acted jointly in any criminal enter-
prise.'4 ' This second exception parallels the joint participant excep-
143. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 102(b)(1) (Current
Proposed).
144. See id. § 102(c).
145. See id. § 102(b)(2)(ii).
146. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(2).
147. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 102(d)(1) (Current
Proposed).
148. See id. § 102(d)(2).
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tion to the husband-wife privilege. 149 Here, the exception is not
limited to criminal activity which is the focus of the criminal proceed-
ing; presumably, the prosecution may defeat the parent-child privilege
if it can show that the defendant and the witness acted jointly in any
criminal conduct, even if it is totally unrelated to the proceeding.
D. Confidential Communications Privilege
1. Scope of the Privilege
The second option available to drafters is the parent-child confiden-
tial communications privilege. More easily justified, this privilege
places a premium on the private nature of communications in the
family context. However, as noted earlier, it can be drafted in such a
way as to create a privilege as broad as the adverse testimony
privilege. 15o
The proposed ABA model extends the privilege to both civil and
criminal proceedings and indicates that either the parent or the child
may prevent the other from disclosing confidential communications
between the parent and the child if either is a party to the proceed-
ing 51 or if either is called to testify before a grand jury.152 However,
the privilege does not apply if the parent-child relationship did not
exist at the time of the confidential communication.153 This limitation
mirrors the similar restriction placed upon the proposed adverse testi-
monial privilege.154
2. Invoking the Privilege
The breadth of any privilege is determined to a great extent by who
is permitted to invoke the privilege. As a general rule, most privileges
may be invoked by the holder of the privilege or by someone on behalf
149. Compare ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 103(d)(2) (Current
Proposed) with TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504.
150. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(i) (West
Supp. 1987). See generally Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications:
An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 10 (1982).
151. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 103(b)(1)(i) (Current
Proposed).
152. See id. § 103(b)(1)(ii).
153. See id. § 103(b)(2)(ii).




of the holder.'55 In several proposed and adopted parent-child privi-
leges, the drafters have suggested that both the testimonial and com-
munications privileges be invocable by either the child or the
parent.' 56 Of course, that is the broadest construction and the most
protective of the parent-child relationship. By analogy to the marital
testimonial privilege, the Trammel decision would not require a par-
ent-child testimonial privilege for the accused parent or accused
child. 157
The proposed ABA model suggests that the confidential communi-
cations privilege be held jointly by the parent and the parent's
child. 5 s However, the model also indicates that "any party to a confi-
dential communication may raise the privilege . . . ." The model
defines "party to a confidential communication" as "a parent or the
parent's child . . . ." That definition, read in conjunction with the
word "any," seems to imply that a sibling member, as a party to the
communication, may invoke the privilege.
The proposed communications privilege is overly broad to the ex-
tent that it encompasses statements made by the parent to the
child. 161 If it is the child's confidential statements which need to be
privileged, then it should be the child alone who holds the privilege,
either as an accused or as a witness. 162 The effect of giving the privi-
155. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 73.1, at 173-74 (3d ed. 1984)(who may as-
sert privilege); id. § 92, at 221-23 (holder of attorney-client privilege).
156. See Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examina-
tion and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 59 (1982). The current Minnesota statute provides for
claims and waivers by either the parent or the child. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(i)
(West Supp. 1987); see also People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 315 (Westchester County
Ct. 1979). However, in Idaho, only the parent may claim the privilege. See IDAHO CODE
§ 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987).
157. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44-46 (1980).
158. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 103(c) (Current Pro-
posed). This provision is confusing. Although the drafters apparently intend to place the
privilege only in the hands of the parent and the child, it could be claimed by a third party as a
member of the family who heard the communication. In any event, a third person should only
be able to claim the ight on behalf of either the child or the parent. Furthermore, the effect of
giving the privilege to both the parent and the child is that an accused parent can suppress
otherwise voluntary testimony by the child concerning statements made by the child to the
parent.
159. Id. § 103(c)(2) (emphasis added).
160. Id. § 101(f).
161. See id. § 101(c). This section indicates that a confidential communication includes
messages between the parent and the parent's child. There is no requirement that only
messages from the child to the parent be protected. See id.
162. Most of the cases which have addressed the issue of whether both the child and the
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lege to both the parent and the child is that an accused parent can
suppress otherwise voluntary testimony by the child concerning state-
ments made by the child to the parent. Rather, any other person
should only be able to claim the privilege on behalf of the child.
Furthermore, it is usually the holder of the privilege who may
waive the privilege.163 Most codified privileges require that any
waiver, whether express or implied, be knowing and voluntary.164
The proposed model includes no reference to waiver but implicitly
suggests that both the child and the parent, as joint holders, must
cooperate in any waiver. 6 5 Thus, a parent-defendant could suppress
an incriminating statement he or she had made to the child although
the child was willing to testify against the parent. Little justification
exists for such a rule.
3. Exceptions
Assuming that the drafters have proposed a broad privilege, some
reasonable limitations may be effected by including exceptions to the
privilege. Typical exceptions include situations in which either the
child or the parent is charged with criminal conduct against the other
or where some sort of legal adversarial relationship is involved. These
types of exceptions are essential to circumscribing otherwise broad
and unmanageable privileges. In addition, such exceptions reflect pol-
icy compromises recognizing important societal interests in declining
to protect certain communications or relationships.' 66
parent's statements should be privileged have focused entirely on communications by the child
to the parent. Indeed, the argument for protecting communications made by a parent to a
child is much weaker. Virtually all of the justifications for the privilege center on the need to
nurture trust by the child in the parent. See Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential
Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 59 (1982). But see Coburn,
Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 599,
632 (1970)(proposing model covering communications by both the child and the parent).
163. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2321, at 629-30 (McNaughten rev. 1961 & Supp.
1986)(only client may waive attorney-client privilege); id. § 2327, at 634-38 (voluntary testi-
mony is waiver); id. § 2340, at 670-73 (marital privilege belongs to communicating spouse); id.
§ 2386, at 851-53 (only patient may waive physician-patient privilege).
164. See, e.g., TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 511 (waiver of privilege by voluntary disclosure);
TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 512 (privilege not waived if erroneously compelled or without opportu-
nity to claim).
165. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 103(c) (Current Pro-
posed). The proposed model should be compared with the Idaho provision which indicates
that only the parent may waive the privilege. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987).
166. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 49, 50 (1980).
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The ABA proposal contains nine fairly typical exceptions. There is
no privilege, inter alia, where the parent and the child are adverse
parties, 167 where the child's parents are adverse parties,168 where
either the parent or the child is charged with a crime against the
other, 169 where the issue of parental misconduct or misfeasance is in
issue, 170 where an action has been brought to establish the competence
of either the parent or the child, 17 1 or where the parent and child were
jointly involved in activity giving rise to the proceeding. 172 This last
exception parallels the joint-actor exception to the husband-wife privi-
lege which has been adopted by some jurisdictions. 173
Again, assuming that a parent-child privilege is appropriate, these
exceptions address those societal interests which outweigh any possi-
ble need to protect a parent-child relationship. The list could be
lengthened by recognizing that in some offenses the government justi-
fiably intrudes into an otherwise private relationship. For example,
where the communication is relevant to a case in which the defendant
is charged with a felony offense, especially a capital offense, the privi-
lege should not apply.
E. Penalties
The drafters of the proposed ABA model have attempted to put
some teeth into the two privileges by setting out penalties, both for
disclosing and for failing to disclose. The first provision addresses the
refusal of a witness to testify as to matters which are not protected by
either privilege or by any other applicable rule of law.' 74 The model
provides that refusal to testify is punishable as contempt and that in
assessing an appropriate penalty the court should consider factors
such as the age, mental condition, future welfare, and safety of the
167. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 103(d)(1) (Current
Proposed).
168. See id. § 103(d)(2).
169. See id. § 103(d)(4).
170. See id. § 103(d)(8).
171. See id. § 103(d)(5).
172. See id. § 103(d)(3).
173. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(i) (West
Supp. 1987). See generally Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications:
An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 10 (1982).
174. See ABA MODEL PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE § 104(a) (Current Pro-
posed).
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witness.1 75 Presumably this provision is included for the purpose of
protecting the parent-child relationship notwithstanding the absence
of a privilege. Depending upon the disposition by the court, there
may be little incentive for either a parent or a child to offer un-
privileged testimony about the other if they suspect that no sanctions
will be imposed.
The second provision addresses the issue of sanctions for testifying
about a confidential communication. It states that either a parent or
child who testifies in the absence of a joint waiver shall be punished by
the court for contempt.1 76 The model fails to delineate whether this
same sanction would apply to any other witness, such as a sibling,
who wrongfully disclosed privileged communications. However, the
model does indicate that if a witness wrongfully discloses the confi-
dential communication, the judge should consider the same criteria in
assessing a penalty.
F. Summary
The proposed ABA model ignores the general trend to adopt only a
confidential communications privilege for statements made by a child
to his or her parent. However, assuming that any privilege is justified,
the proposal presents several major problems. First, its broad defini-
tion of the key term "parent" creates problems of application. It
opens the door to unbridled application and expansion of a more gen-
eralized and unjustified "family" privilege. Second, by permitting
persons other than a minor child to invoke the privileges, the model is
unnecessarily broad in covering those interests which proponents
claim to be at the heart of the privilege-encouraging disclosures by
children to their parents. Third, although the listed exceptions to the
privilege are acceptable, any codification of a parent-child privilege
should include some provision for recognizing that in certain serious
offenses, whatever justification might exist for the privilege should de-
fer to the public good.
V. CONCLUSION
The momentum for adopting a parent-child privilege seems to have
been generated by a few courts and a number of commentators who
175. See id. § 104(a)(3).
176. See id. § 104(b).
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see the privilege as an important protector of the family unit.
Although there may be several superficially attractive social and pol-
icy arguments, there is simply no merit to the constitutional or legal
arguments offered in support of the privilege. The best constitutional
argument proponents have been able to muster is the implicit right to
privacy which, to date, has been granted limited application by the
United States Supreme Court. The proponents' strongest support for
their contention is that dicta and implications of right to privacy deci-
sions favor establishment of a constitutional right to family privacy.
What the proponents fail to address is the fact that aside from the
privilege against self-incrimination, the Court has not recognized a
specific constitutional right to any particular testimonial privilege.
Rather, the Court has generally relied upon the common law. Nor
have the proponents of a parent-child privilege satisfactorily demon-
strated that there has been widespread abuse of family relationships to
obtain evidence, either in civil or criminal proceedings. If there are
abuses, the remedy lies not in the adoption of an exclusionary rule,
but instead in taking administrative or legal steps against those caus-
ing the abuse.
Even assuming that a parent-child privilege is supported by the
proponents' myriad arguments, there remains the problem of drafting
a parent-child privilege that recognizes the delicate balance between
the interests of the parent and child and the public's right to reliable
evidence. In examining the carefully drafted and well-debated ABA
model, it becomes apparent that a slippery and difficult slope awaits
the drafter in defining key terms, determining the scope of the privi-
lege, and identifying who may properly claim the privilege. Unless a
parent-child privilege is narrowly-tailored, it will soon become a
much broader and entirely useless "family" privilege.
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VI. APPENDICES
A. Appendix A: ABA Model Parent-Child Privileges Statute
§ (CURRENT PROPOSED)
101. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this statute, the following words and phrases have the
meanings indicated:
(a) "Adverse" means incriminating or which has a substantial likeli-
hood of incriminating.
(b) "Child" means a person who has not reached the age of majority.
(c) "Confidential communication" means a message intended to convey
a meaning, made between a parent and the parent's child with the rea-
sonable expectation its content not be known by anyone except family
members. The message may be made by any means including oral,
written or sign language or assertive conduct.
(d) "Family member" means a parent or the parent's child.
(e) "Parent" means a birth, adoptive or step-parent or legal guardian.
It also means any person the court recognizes to have acquired a right
to act as a parent, such as a foster parent or relative having long term
custody of a child.
(f) "Party to a confidential communication" means a parent or the par-
ent's child who makes a confidential communication or who was in-
tended to receive that confidential communication.
(g) "Proceeding" means any matter pending before any judicial or ad-
ministrative body where testimony under oath is required.
102. ADVERSE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE.
(a)(1) Privilege Created. There is an adverse testimonial privilege.
(2) The privilege is delineated by this Section.
(b)(1) Scope. The adverse testimonial privilege exists when either a
parent or the parent's child is:
(i) a defendant in a criminal proceeding or the subject of a juve-
nile delinquency proceeding, and the other is called to give testimony;
or
(ii) called to give testimony concerning the other in a grand jury
proceeding.
(2)(i) Neither a parent nor the parent's child who validly asserts the
adverse testimonial privilege in a proceeding may be compelled to pro-
vide an answer to a question if it would be adverse to the other.
(ii) However, a parent or a child who is a witness may not assert
the privilege in response to a question about a matter that occurred at a
time when the relationship of parent and child did not exist.
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(c) Witness Held. The adverse testimonial privilege is held by the par-
ent or the child who is a witness.
(d) Exceptions. There is no adverse testimonial privilege:
(1) When the proceeding concerns an offense against the person or
property of the witness or a family member that is purported to have
been committed by the witness' parent or child; or
(2) When it is purported that the witness is involved with his or her
parent or child in any criminal activity.
103. CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE.
(a)(1) Privilege Created. There is a confidential communications
privilege.
(2) It is delineated by this Section.
(b)(1) Scope. The confidential communications privilege may be as-
serted by a parent or the parent's child when either of them is:
(i) a party to any proceeding and the other is called to give testi-
mony; or
(ii) called to give testimony concerning the other in a grand jury
proceeding.
(2)(i) Neither a parent nor the parent's child may be compelled to
answer a question concerning confidential communications if the confi-
dential communications privilege is validly asserted in a proceeding.
(ii) However, the witness may be compelled to answer a question
if at the time the confidential communication was made the parent-child
relationship did not exist.
(c) Jointly Held.
(1) The confidential communications privilege is jointly held by each
party to a confidential communication.
(2) Any party to a confidential communication may raise the privi-
lege and thereby prevent the communication from being disclosed by
the other party in any proceeding.
(d) Exceptions. There is no confidential communications privilege in
any proceeding in which:
(1) A parent and the parent's child are opposing parties;
(2) A child's parents are opposing parties;
(3) The parent or the parent's child is a party, if the parent and the
child were jointly involved in activity giving rise to the proceeding;
(4) A parent or the parent's child is a party in any criminal or juve-
nile proceeding if the basis of the proceeding is alleged acts committed
against the person or property of a family member;
(5) An action is brought to commit a parent or child because of al-
leged mental incompetence or a mental disorder or to establish a parent
or child's mental competence;
(6) An action is brought to place the person or property of a parent
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or the parent's child in the custody or control of another because of
alleged mental or physical incompetence;
(7) The neglect, dependency, deprivation, abandonment or non-sup-
port of a child's parent or a parent's child is at issue;
(8) The mental, physical or sexual abuse of a parent or the parent's
child is at issue; or
(9) Termination of parental rights is at issue.
104. PENALTIES.
(a) Penalty for Nondisclosure of Testimony
(1) If no adverse testimonial privilege or confidential communica-
tions privilege exists, the court shall require the person to testify pro-
vided no other rule or law prevents the compelled disclosure of that
testimony.
(2) Refusal to testify is punishable by the court as contempt.
(3) If the witness refuses to disclose the compelled testimony in vio-
lation of paragraph (2), the court, in determining the appropriate pen-
alty, shall consider among other factors:
(i) The age, and the mental and physical condition of the witness;
and
(ii) The present and future welfare and protection of the witness.
(b) Penalty for Unauthorized Disclosure of a Privileged Confidential
Communication
(1) If a confidential communication is held to be privileged, the wit-
ness shall not disclose the confidential communication in a proceeding.
(2) A parent or child who discloses a privileged confidential commu-
nication in a proceeding which has been validly raised may be punished
by the court for contempt.
(3) If a witness discloses the confidential communication in violation
of paragraph (2), the court, in determining the appropriate penalty,
shall consider among other factors:
(i) The age, and the mental and physical condition of the witness;
and
(ii) The present and future welfare and protection of the witness.
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B. Appendix B. Comment Attending ABA Model Parent-Child
Privileges Statute (Current Proposed)
DEFINITIONS
(Section 101)
(a) Adverse: One of the principle purposes of the parent-child priv-
ileges statute is to prevent a parents [sic] and their children from be-
ing forced to give incriminating testimony against each other. The
word "adverse" is used to describe questions, the answer to which
would be "incriminating or have a substantial likelihood of being in-
criminating." The defined word "adverse" is used principally in Sub-
section 102(b)(1).
It may not be possible to determine that the answer to the question
would absolutely be incriminating. Therefore, a lesser standard of
"substantial likelihood" is provided that permits testimony to be pre-
cluded on that basis.
(b) Child: The age by which a person is determined to be a "child"
is determined by each State's law on the age of majority. The defini-
tion does not provide for a mentally defective person to be considered
a "child" once that person has reached the age of majority. There-
fore, in rare instances when a person's chronological age has reached
the age of majority but the mental age is in question, it shall be left to
the court to determine if that person fall[s] within the definition of
"child" as used in this statute.
(c) Confidential Communication: The definition of "confidential
communication" is intended to be broad. It gives recognition to the
fact that children often communicate with their parents by means
other than the spoken word. Young children are especially prone to
communicate confidentially with their parents by gestures, expres-
sions of emotion, unique mannerisms or other behavior, the meaning
of which is clearly understood by the parent and the child.
The presence of a family member when a confidential communica-
tion is made between parent and child will not void the privilege.
This is a recognition of the closeness of persons living in family units.
It may not be possible for a parent and a child to communicate with
each other without some other family member being privy to the com-
munication. In addition, the closeness of the family unit may negate
the parents and children to perceive a need [sic] to communicate
secretly among themselves. The statute does not seek to punish par-
ents and children who have this kind of open relationship within their
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family. However, the statute does not create a family or sibling privi-
lege. Therefore, any family member who is present when the confi-
dential communication is made cannot raise the privilege to preclude
being required to testify.
(d) Family Member: The definition of "family member" is limited
to the nuclear family (i.e. parents and their children). The term is
used in the definition of "confidential communication" to restrict this
term to the select communications that are made within the family
unit with the expectation that it will [be] known only to parents and
siblings. It is also used in Section 102(c)(1) and 103(d)(4). These sub-
sections create exceptions to the raising [of] the adverse testimonial
privilege and the confidential communications privilege when the par-
ent and the child have competing interests.
(e) Parent: The definition of "parent" includes those person[s]
who most commonly have a parental relationship with a child. It is
possible that a child could at different times have all categories of
these parents (i.e. birth parents, adoptive parents, step parents [sic]
and legal guardians). However, the confidential communications
privileges [sic] and the adverse testimonial privilege may only be as-
serted with regard to communications that occurred at the time the
parent and child relationship existed. Cases in which there is a dis-
pute as to whether the relationship existed will be resolved by the
courts. This is reinforced by subsections 102(b)(2)(ii) and
103(b)(2)(ii). Even a birth parent may be found to have relinquished
the parental relationship in certain circumstances, such as when there
has been an adoption. Similarly, a communication made between a
child and someone who has not yet become the child's step parent
[sic] (or who has ceased to be a step parent [sic] due to divorce) would
not be subject to either of the privileges. (See Subsections
102(b)(2)(ii) and 103(b)(2)(ii)).
Whether or not it includes foster parents (and thereby extends the
privileges to foster parents and children in their care) is left to the
discretion of the court. The court also would have the discretion to
recognize the existence of a parent/child relationship between a child
and other persons. Typical examples would be grandparents or an
aunt and an uncle who are raising the child. It could also include
situations where a parent/child relationship exists but there is no bio-
logical or legal relationship between the two parties.
(f) Party to a Confidential Communication: The definition limits
this phrase to a parent and the parent's child. In addition, the parent
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or the child must have been intended to be the recipient of the com-
munication. Therefore, if a child confides something to one parent
with the intent that it not be know[n] by the other parent, the privi-
lege cannot be raised to foreclose testimony by the parent who was
not the intended recipient of the communication.
The phrase does not include family members. The presence of a
family member during the making of a confidential communication
does not make the family member a "party to the confidential com-
munication" as defined by the statute. In this situation, the privilege
does not extend to the family member.
(g) Proceeding: This definition is consistent with Rule 1101 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. It guarantees that the privileges apply at




Section 102 addresses the first of the two privileges created by this
statute. It is known as the "adverse testimonial privilege."
Subsection (a): This subsection contains the operative language
that creates the privilege. The privilege is described in subsection (b).
Subsection (b): The parent/child adverse testimonial privilege is
similar to the testimonial marital privilege articulated in Trammel v.
U.S., 445 U.S. 40 (1980). As stated in subsection (b), the privilege
may be asserted only by the parent or child who is a witness. It may
only be asserted in criminal proceedings, juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, or grand jury proceedings.
Paragraph (2) contains the critical language that vests a parent or a
child with the right to raise the privilege in order to preclude being
forced to answer any question' adverse to the other. This same para-
graph makes it clear that the right to raise the privilege only exists if
the question relates to a matter the [sic] occurred at the time when the
parent/child relationship existed. (See [sic] discussion under defini-
tion of "Parent.")
Subsection (c): This subsection states the exceptions to the adverse
testimonial privilege. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) recognize neces-
sary exceptions to the adverse testimonial privilege to when full dis-
closure in the factfinding process outweighs the policy of promoting
family harmony.
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Paragraph (c)(1) is necessary to permit family members to testify con-
cerning acts of violence on the part of a parent or a child against other
family members. This exception is made because the safety of family
members and the security of their property is regarded as being para-
mount to protecting the relationship between a parent and a child. In
addition, the existence of violence and property destruction within the
family is strong evidence that one of the primary reasons for the privi-
lege (i.e. protecting the unity of the family) has ceased to exist.
Paragraph (c)(2) is necessary to protect society from criminal activity
on the part of a parent and the parent's child. This exception is created
in recognition that the privilege should not be permitted to be used as a
shield to protect parents and children who jointly commit crimes.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
(Section 103)
Section 103 addresses the second of the two privileges created by
this statute. It is known as the "confidential communications
privilege."
Subsection (a): This subsection contains the operative language
that creates the privilege. The privilege is described in subsection (b).
Subsection (b): There are a number of differences between the ad-
verse testimonial privilege outlined in Section 102 and the confidential
communications privilege. These differences are created through the
divergent provisions in subsection[s] 102(b) and 103(b).
Subsection 103(b) provides that the confidential communications
privilege applies in "any proceeding." (See 103(b)(1)(i)). Unlike the
adverse testimonial privilege, it is not limited to proceedings that are
criminal in nature. This distinction between the privileges arises be-
cause the adverse testimonial privilege only seeks to protect parents
and their children from being compelled to make statements that may
be directly "incriminating" to each other, hence surfacing in the con-
text of a criminal proceeding. It acts as a bar to the State from abus-
ing its authority to force parents and children to testify against each
other.
The confidential communications privilege has a broader purpose.
It is not intended merely to prevent abuse by the prosecutorial author-
ities. It seeks to grant sanctity and protection to all communications
between parents and their children that those parties intend to be con-
fidential. For this reason, the privilege acts as a shield to preclude
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these communications from being disclosed in any forum, whether it
be criminal or civil.
Another distinction is created by paragraph 103(b)(1). It provides
that the confidential communication privilege may be asserted by
either a parent or the parent's child. Unlike the adverse testimonial
privilege, it need not be asserted by the witness. The rationale of al-
lowing either party to the communication to assert the privilege is
based on the fact that the communication is a confidence between
them. Since both of them have an interest in it, both of them should
be able to invoke the privilege. This concept is amplified by subsec-
tion (c).
Subsection (b)(2) explains the result of the confidential communica-
tion privilege being asserted. When it is validly asserted in a proceed-
ing (and no exception in subsection (d) applies) the witness may not
be compelled to disclose, nor voluntarily disclose, the confidential
communication. It should be noted however, that this subsection
makes it clear that the witness may be compelled to answer a question
if the parent-child relationship did not exist at the time of the confi-
dential communication. (See [sic] discussion under definition of
"Parent.")
Subsection (c) amplifies this concept by stating that the privilege is
jointly held. Under its provisions, either the parent or the child can to
[sic] raise it to preclude the other from disclosing, through testimony,
the nature of the communication.
The phrase "party to a confidential communication," is defined by
the statute. The implications of its meaning should be noted when
used in paragraph (c)(2). As was discussed in the comment to this
defined phrase, the presence of a family member when a confidential
communication is made between a parent and the parent's child will
not void the privilege. However, as is true with the adverse testimo-
nial privilege, the family member is not covered by the privilege. This
is in keeping with the fact that the statute does not create a family or
sibling privilege.
Subsection (d): This subsection outlines nine exceptions to the con-
fidential communications privilege. Each situation covers an instance
where the parent and the child have competing interests, they are
jointly involved in some criminal activity, or it would not promote the
purpose of family harmony for the privilege to be exercised.
Paragraph (d)(1) applies to situation[s] in which the parent and child
are opposing parties. Since this suggests that the parent and child vol-
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untarily placed themselves in the adversarial position, the policies be-
hind the statute of preserving and fostering family harmony fail. In
addition, it would be unfair to permit one of the parties to use the privi-
lege to silence the other's testimony about a confidential communication
that could contain exculpatory evidence.
Paragraph (d)(2) serves to prevent collusion between a child and one of
the parents against the other parent. It is intended to cover those situa-
tions where the interest of the child could be affected. In addition, it
covers situations in which one parent may unduly influence a child and
seek to use the child to the detriment of the other parent.
Paragraph (d)(3) applies to civil and criminal proceedings. The deter-
mination of whether the parent and child were jointly involved in the
activity which gave rise to the proceeding is left to the court. In situa-
tions where a parent and a child are together involved in illegal activity
or wrongful conduct the factfinding process outweighs the policy con-
sideration of preserving and promoting family harmony. This is partic-
ularly true when either the parent or the child is using the other as an
unwitting accomplice.
Paragraph (d)(4) is necessary to prevent the possibility of the privilege
being used as a shield when innocent family members' person or prop-
erty has been victimized by a parent or child.
Paragraphs (d)(5) and (6) apply in situations where mental competency
is at issue. In order for the court to protect the rights of the person who
is the subject of the proceeding, it is necessary that full disclosure of
communications between parents and their children be disclosed. The
need for truth in the factfinding process is the overriding consideration
in such matters.
Paragraphs (d)(7), (8) and (9) state nine specific situations in which no
privilege may exist under the statute. These are situations into which
the court must often step to protect not only the individual's rights but
the individual himself from harm from a parent or child. It should be
noted that paragraph (8) is intended to cover not only mental, physical
and sexual abuse inflicted by parents on children, but also inflicted by
children on a parent (e.g. elderly, disabled, etc.). The exceptions are
created by paragraphs (7), (8) and (9), because there should be no obsta-
cles in the path of the factfinding process.
PENALTIES
(Section 104)
Section 104 states the penalties for noncompliance with the provi-
sions of the statute.
Subsection (a): Paragraph (a)(1) creates a penalty for failure to pro-
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vide testimony when an adverse testimonial privilege or confidential
communications privilege does not exist, or when "no other rule or
law" would prevent compelled disclosure of the witness' testimony.
Paragraph (a)(2) states that a court's inherent contempt powers
should be used to punish failures to testify. Paragraph (3) sets out
factors the court should consider in fashioning the appropriate pen-
alty. Since a child could be the one charged with contempt, the court
should take the factors in subparagraphs (3)(i) and (ii) into considera-
tion when fashioning a penalty.
Subsection (b): This subsection applies only to the confidential
communications privilege. It gives an incentive for these communica-
tions to be held in confidence by providing penalties when they are
disclosed in testimony in a way that violates the statute. Paragraph
(2) states that the court should use its inherent contempt powers to
punish unauthorized disclosures. Subparagraphs (3)(i) and (ii) set out
factors the court should consider when deciding the penalty for unau-
thorized disclosure of a privileged confidential communication.
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